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DRAWING A LINE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SAND
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE FOREIGN CITIZEN
"CYBERSQUATTER"
"Cybersquatting" on the Internet is a phenomenon that has warranted an
amendment to the Trademark Dilution Act of the Lanham Act. The undisputed
omnipresence of the Internet, as well as the boundless possibilities of infringement
activity on the Internet, has made such an amendment inevitable, as well as
necessary. Congress'power to regulate trademark infringement activity, whether
traditionally or on the Internet, relies on the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. The author asserts that participation in the Internet domain name
registration process itself does not constitute the "commercial activity in
commerce" requirement of the Trademark Dilution Act; in turn, such an act does
not constitute commercial activity for the purposes of the Commerce Clause. Such
analysis also depends on a careful look at the Internet's uniquely amorphous and
borderless structure, complicated by the fact that no one nation has clear control
on the Internet. Ultimately, this Note concludes that under traditional Commerce
Clause analysis, foreign citizens' registration of domain names with intent to sell
those registered domain names does not substantially affect interstate commerce,
and that applying the Lanham Act to this activity is an improper application of
Congress' Commerce Clause power.
INTRODUCTION
On September 14, 1999, the District Court of Massachusetts enjoined the
activity of a Canadian "cybersquatter;" defendant Northern Lights Club is being
haled into the Massachusetts court by an American business, Northern Light
Technology.' Northern Light alleges that the defendant's registered domain name,
www.northernlights.com, infringes upon its domain name, www.northernlight.com,
by causing consumer confusion. Bernard J. Bonn, III, counsel for the plaintiff,
notes that the finding of infringement marks the end of this type of activity and hails
it as a big step in the preservation of trademark rights in the Internet context. He
remarks: "They can no longer feel secure sitting up there thinking that they are not
going to be sued successfully in the United States. Once they enter into American
' Robert L. Sharpe, Jr., US. Federal Court Reaches into Canada to Enjoin Internet
Cyber-Squatter, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 14, 1999, available at LEXIS, Regional
News.
2 See id.
See id.
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commerce via the Internet, they can be hauled into an American court."4
With increased reliance on "e-commerce," this variety of "cybersquatting"
claim is being raised with epidemic frequency in American courts; however, this
appears to be the first attempt to curtail the activities of a Canadian citizen.,s
Previous attempts to regulate the activity of United States citizen "cybersquatters"
have required courts to stretch the traditional application of the Lanham Act,6 as it
was intended to protect registered trademarks. The 1995 Trademark Dilution Act7
provides a cause of action for those marks which lose intrinsic value based on the
concurrent use by another identical or confusingly similar mark The power of the
mark to identify its owner is said to be "diluted" or decreased in the event that it is
confused with one of another origin.'
Recent regulation of "cybersquatter" activity falls squarely under the November
1999 amendment to the Trademark Dilution Act.'" Registered trademark holder
response to the amendment has been overwhelming, with several cases filed a
matter of days after the amendment's passage." At this time, however, none of
these early filings have proceeded to judgment, so it is yet unclear how courts will
apply this highly-specialized statutory language to "cybersquatters," both foreign
and domestic.
Congress' power to regulate in the area of trademark law traditionally has been
founded upon the enumerations of the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.'2 The application of the Trademark Dilution Act to non-United States
citizen Internet users requires a sweeping interpretation of the Commerce Clause
powers because it relies upon a finding that the international "cybersquatter" makes
a commercial use of the trademark which he has merely registered as an Internet
domain name.
The focus of this Note lies in the argument that Congress lacks such a power,
under the Commerce Clause, to regulate those who squat on American trademark-
domain names from beyond the nation's borders. Participation in the Internet
domain name registration process by itself does not constitute "commercial activity
in commerce" as required by the Trademark Dilution Act and therefore is not a
commercial activity for the purposes of the Commerce Clause.
It is critical to begin any discussion of Internet regulation with a brief
4id
Seeid.
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1946).
7 Id. at § 1125.
' See id.
9 Seeid
10 See id.
" See infra notes 140, 143, and accompanying text.
12 See I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 5.3, at 5-6 (4th ed. 1996).
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introduction to the Internet itself-what it is, how it developed, and how its capacity
as a commercial and communications medium is limited by unique physical and
technical constraints. Following this is a non-technical explanation of the Internet
domain name and domain name registration process, specifically highlighting the
Internet's amorphous, borderless structure and the inherent difficulties which come
from a lack of clear national control.
In order to discuss the application of the Commerce Clause power to the
Canadian "cybersquatter" case in the District Court of Massachusetts, it is also
necessary to outline briefly-the development of modern trademark law, examining
the ways in which prior courts have chosen to regulate domestic "cybersquatting"
under the Trademark Dilution Act and anticipating courts' interpretations of the
recent cyber-piracy amendment to the Act. Given this background, this Note seeks
to clearly define "cybersquatting" based on corporate trademark holders' previous
attempts to curtail the activities of United States citizen "cybersquatters."
In light of the conflicting views of domestic-focused precedent, this Note
specifically analyzes whether "cybersquatting" constitutes "commercial use in
commerce" of a registered trademark as required by the Trademark Dilution Act.
This Note concludes that under traditional Commerce Clause analysis, foreign
citizens' registration of domain names with intent to sell those registered names
does not substantially affect interstate commerce, and that the application of the
Lanham Act to this activity is an improper application of Congress' Commerce
Clause power. In conclusion, it highlights the need for global participation in the
structuring of Internet regulations, beginning primarily with international
cooperation.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNET
A. Development
In the 1960s, the Pentagon encouraged the Rand Corporation to expand its
research in the area of communications. 3 The concept of a "fish-net"
communications network was conceived by Raid scientist Paul Baran; if one link
in the computer-based network became disabled, information traveling along the
network could simply re-route and reach its destination by means of an alternate
path." In 1962, the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Project
Association (ARPA) implemented a system based on Baran's research, which it
,3 Berit Erickson, History of the Internet, PBS Online, at http://www.pbs.org/intemet/
timeline (last modified Oct. 15, 1998).
"4 Bruce Sterling, Short History of the Internet, MAG. FANTASY & SCI. FICTiON (Feb.
1993), at http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Intemet/History/ShortHistoryof theIntemet
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later called ARPANET. 5 This early system paved the way for the creation of what
later would be called the Internet: "not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a
giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer
networks. It is thus a network of networks."' 6
The World Wide Web ("the web") presents information on the Internet .in a
graphical format.' A "page" on the web textually and pictographically conveys
information which has been stored in a computer data file.' The web page offers
multimedia access to all of the information stored in the data file, including sound,
video, and pictures. 9 Individual web pages are commonly accessed through a
"home page;" similar to a cover sheet or table of contents, the home page organizes
and identifies all of the information being conveyed by the site's creator.2" Once
information is posted on a web page, it is accessible to all Internet users
worldwide.2' This ability to deliver to a single user in any part of the world
information from anywhere else in the world has been hailed as the Internet's most
important feature.22
Unlike all other existing forms of communication, the Internet is not
constrained in any way by geographical boundaries.3 This nearly limitless
accessibility has facilitated the development of the Internet into an efficient
international medium of commerce and communications, offering commercial
entities the possibility of communicating with, and marketing to, a nearly infinite
number of consumers from across the globe.
IS See id
16 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
See generally Sterling, supra note 14 (discussing the history of the Internet).
"7 See Ira S. Nathenson, Comment, Showdown at the Domain Name Corral: Property
Rights and Personal Jurisdiction Over Squatters, Poachers, and Other Parasites, 58 U.
Pmr. L. REV. 911, 918 (quoting Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836).
IS See id.
See, e.g., Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting
that web page contains "names, words, messages, pictures, sounds, and links to other
information"); see also Nathenson, supra note 17, at 914 n.5.
20 See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836.
21 See id at 844.
22 See id, at 837.
23 See Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (identifying
geography as "a virtually meaningless construct on the Intemet"); see also Nathenson, supra
note 17, at 985 (recognizing "one of the most important aspects of the Internet-the ability
to transcend geographical boundaries") (quoting G. Peter Albert, Jr., Right on the Mark:
Defining the Nexus Between Trademarks and Internet Domain Names, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 277, 309 (1997)).
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B. The Internet Domain Name
Internet domain names are commonly analogized to telephone numbers and
street addresses.' The domain name's direct association with a name, word, or
phrase distinguishes it, however, from randomly assigned or designated identifiers."
For example, while a telephone number is most often comprised of a group of
randomly selected numerical digits, most Internet domain names are carefully
chosen to most logically and creatively represent the name's owner. 6
The Internet domain name consists of three principal parts, each identifying a
web page's specific location on the Internet network and separated by a period.2
Reading from left to right, the first group of characters identifies the server, the
most common example of which is the World Wide Web (represented by the letters
"www").28 The second group is known as the second-level domain name." This
unique combination of alphanumeric characters distinguishes the site and identifies
its origin or owner." The second-level domain name is chosen by the site's creator
and may include a name, trademark, or other generic word." The third group of
characters, the top-level domain (TLD) identifies the site owner's category of use,
".edu" (educational use) and ".gov" (government use) being practical examples."
There are currently two different TLD forms: geographic and generic."
Geographic TLDs are controlled by the national registration agencies of each
country participating in Internet use. 4 For example, ".uk" is the TLD controlled by
24 See, e.g., Nathenson, supra note 17, at 918 (explaining the analogy).
25 See Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998); see also
Reservation Help: Glossary ("Domain Name '), Network Solutions, Inc., at http://www.
networksolutions.com/cgi-bin/glossary/ookupterm=Domain%20Name (last visited Nov.
16, 1999).
26 See Toeppen, 141 F.3d at 1325 (noting that "a telephone number... is distinguishable
from a domain name because a domain name is associated with a word or phrase").
27 See Reservation Help: Glossary ("." or "dot"), Network Solutions, Inc., at http://
www.networksolutions.com/cgi-bin/glossary/ookuptermn--/22,%22%20or/2Odot (last
visited Nov. 16, 1999).
21 See Reservation Help: Glossary ("Top-level Domain"), Network Solutions, Inc., at
http://www.networksolutions.com/cgi-bin/glossary/lookup?term=Top-level%2Domain (last
visited Nov. 16, 1999).
29 See Reservation Help: Glossary ("Second-level Domain "), Network Solutions, Inc.,
athttp://www.networksolutions.com/cgi-bin/glossary/ookup?term=Second%20Level%20
Domain (last visited Nov. 16, 1999).
3 See Network Solutions, Inc., at http://www.networksolutions.com (last visited Nov.
16, 1999).
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See Nathenson, supra note 17, at 920-21.
31 See IANA Country Code Top Level Domain Database, at http://www.iana.
org/cctld/cctld-whois.htm (last modified Oct. 31, 1999).
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the United Kingdom.35 The geographical TLD available in the United States is
cc736wihnts
.us. Registration within this TLD has been administered by the United States
Domain Registry." Despite its availability, the ".us" designation is used less
frequently than its generic TLD counterparts."
There are currently six types of generic TLDs available: ".edu" (educational
use), ".org" (organizational use), ".net" (network use), ".gov" (government use),
".mil" (United States Armed Forces use), and ".com" (commercial use).39 Although
commonly mistaken as being a strictly United States designation like ".us," several
of the generic TLDs are internationally available.'0 Second-level domain names
within this limited number of internationally available TLDs are in increasingly
short supply.4' The ".com" TLD has become, without rival, the most popular
generic TLD in use worldwide. 2
C. The Registration Process
Generic TLDs are currently issued through InterNIC, ajoint effort of Network
Solutions, Inc. (NSI), and the United States government.43 A domain name can be
registered simply by accessing the NSI/InterNIC web site; registration forms may
be filled out online and are submitted with a payment of seventy dollars." The
registrant is limited to a name consisting of twenty-six alphanumeric characters, but
NSI recommends choosing a shorter designation to facilitate Internet searches.45
In completing the registration process, the registrant affirms that the chosen
domain name "does not interfere with or infringe upon the rights of any third party
... and is not intended for any unlawful purpose."'6 Once an application is filed,
NSI will not deny a request based on infringement of an otherwise registered
trademark, nor will it analyze a registration for possible misrepresentation of
35 See id.
36 See id
37 See id.
36 See Nathenson, supra note 17, at 920-21.
39 See Generic Top Level Domains, IANA Country Code Top Level Domain Database,
at http://www.iana.org/generic.html (last modified Oct. 31, 1999).
40 See id
41 See id
42 See Nathenson, supra note 17, at 922.
43 See Network Solutions, Inc., athttp://www.networksolutions.comlservices (last visited
Nov. 16, 1999).
" See Payment Options, Network Solutions, Inc., at http://www.networksolutions.
com/purchase/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 1999).
"s See Reservation Help: Index, Network Solutions, Inc., at http://www.network
solutions.com (last visited Nov. 16, 1999).
46 Id.
466 [Vol. 9:2
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information.47 Rather, a registration is denied only if an identical domain name
already exists.48
NSI assigns domain names on a first-come, first-served basis and allows an
applicant to either register a domain name for immediate use or reserve a domain
name-for use at some time in the future.49 A registrant is limited to the purchase of
a maximum often domain names at any one time. 0
The first-come, first-served system has the practical effect of limiting the use
of any particular combination of alphanumeric characters to only one registrant,
being quite logically-the one who registers first.5 For individuals, businesses, and
organizations sharing similar or identical names, this policy has become the source
of many problems.'2 In other words, "once a good name is gone, it's gone for
good."'3
Continued reliance on the ".com" TLD without the addition of other universal
commercial use top level domains, coupled with the first-come, first-served
registration system, poses a real threat to the continued viability of the Internet as
an effective, user-friendly tool. 4 While the combinations of alphanumeric
47 See id
48 See General Help: Legal Questions, Network Solutions, Inc., at http://www.network
solutions.com (last visited Nov. 16, 1999).
49 See Reservation Help: Index, Network Solutions, Inc., at http://www.
networksolutions.com (last visited Nov. 16, 1999); see generally ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 830-48 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (discussing the nature of
cyberspace).
so See Reservation Help: Index, Network Solutions, Inc., at http://www.network
solutions.com (last visited Nov. 16, 1999).
" See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that
"once a domain-name combination is reserved, it cannot be used by anybody else, unless the
first registrant voluntarily or otherwise relinquishes its registration").
52 Suppose, for example, there are two businesses whose names include the word "ace."
One, Ace Books, wants to register the domain name "www.ace.com" but is prevented from
doing so because the other, Ace Markets, has already registered this exact domain name.
Although it is possible for Ace Books to register as "www.acebooks.com," the shorter
designation is clearly preferable. "[S]ince the value of a domain name corresponds to the
simplest, shortest way of expressing a trademark or trade name, doubtlessly most parties
prefer the shorter version." Nathenson, supra note 17, at 954.
" Id. at 925; see also Danielle Weinberg Swartz, Comment, The Limitations of
Trademark Law in Addressing Domain Name Disputes, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1487, 1493
(1998) ("A single trademark holder who succeeds in obtaining prior registration with NSI
can therefore preclude all other identical trademark holders from registering the same
trademark as a domain name.").
14 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:72.1, at 25-146-47 (noting that one reason for
the addition of top-level domains is that only one domain name can exist from a single,
specific combination of characters, while under trademark law, concurrent use of a mark is
possible).
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characters for use in second-level domain names are potentially limitless, as
previously highlighted, domain names are simply not assigned or chosen at
random." The Internet encourages commercial use and market expansion due to
its ability to reach a worldwide consumer base and universal application. It is,
therefore, an invaluable resource to commercial entities which, in the present
absence of regulation, takes into consideration the multiplicity of competing
interests involved and must be tapped quickly and stealthily, in a way which will
reach the largest potential number of consumers.
D. Domain Names as Trademarks
The purpose of an Internet domain name as a locator, an address identifying a
web site's place on the Internet network, is clear. The domain name may also serve
to identify a particular company's business, products, or reputation, much in the
same manner as a trade or service mark. 6
The value of the domain name is enhanced if it is clearly representative of a
company's business, whether that be its trademark, products, or other creatively
identifying characteristic. 7 The consumer uses whatever domain name the
company chooses to locate that company on the web. Quite logically, the wealth
of resources available on the Internet go untapped if the user is unable to locate the
sites he wishes to visit.5s
When faced with the difficult task of selecting a domain name for a corporate
home page, companies have learned that it is best to choose a name that is short and
easy to remember. 9 While Internet browsers and site-search software provide a
user-friendly approach to Internet searching, a browser may provide too many
options and may give repetitive or irrelevant information. The most valuable
domain names, therefore, are those which can be guessed or recalled without the use
of a search engine.'
" See supra note 26.
56 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at 7-24 ("In the same way that businesses sometimes
desire to have a prestige business address, businesses want a prestige address in cyberspace
that corresponds to the trade name of the company or to a company trademark.").
" See J. Theodore Smith, Note, "l-800-RIPOFFS.COM": Internet Domain Names are
the Telephone Numbers of Cyberspace, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 1169, 1175 (1997) (citing Sally
M. Abel, Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: The Brave New Frontier, in UNDERSTANDING
BASIC TRADEMARK LAW 1996 at 151, 154 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 451, 1996)).
"s See Stacy B. Sterling, Comment, New Age Bandits in Cyberspace: Domain Names
Held Hostage on the Internet, 17 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 733, 735 (1997) ("It is well
recognized that a business cannot function unless its customers and potential customers
know where to find it.").
s9 See id
I "A customer who is unsure about a company's domain name will often guess that the
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Registration of a trade or service mark with the Patent and Trademark Office
confers significant rights upon the mark's holder.6 ' A trademark holder naturally
expects that he or she will receive exclusive use rights in a certain mark and will
receive legal protection in the event of concurrent or confusingly similar use.62
Registration of an Internet domain name does not currently confer trademark rights
upon the registrant, however.' A domain name registrant may be able to -register
the chosen domain name itself as a trademark, and NSI currently recommends that
the registrant initiate that process on his or her own if there is a potential concern
as to infringement or dilution in that context.'
Registration of a mark with the Patent and Trademark Office allows for
multiple use of the same mark provided that this does not lead to consumer
confusion.6 In stark contrast, the physical limitations of the Internet do not allow
for more than one of any specific combination of characters, regardless of
differentiated use, markets, or geographic area." As a locating device, the domain
name can point only to one specific location on the World Wide Web. Should
another registrant beat the trademark owner to the registration of a trademark as a
domain name, the value of that trademark with respect to that specific TLD is
essentially usurped.
The drive to acquire a user-friendly Internet domain name had started a mad
dash to NSI registration, with companies seeking to register the most recognizable
domain name is also the company's name. For this reason, 'a domain name mirroring a
corporate name may be a valuable corporate asset, as it facilitates communication with a
customer base."' Cardservice Int'l v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(quoting MTV Networks, Inc. v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202,203-04 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). See
also Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Competition: The Recent History, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 29 (1996) ("Easily identified trademarks reduce the costs consumers
incur in searching for what they desire, and the lower the costs of search the more
competitive the market.") (quoting Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423,
1429 (7th Cir. 1985)).
61 See I MCCARTHY, supra notel2, § 2:14, at 2-29 (equating a trademark to a property
right).
62 See l id. at 2-29-30.
63 See General Help: Legal Questions, Network Solutions, Inc., at http://www.network
solutions.com (last visited Nov. 16, 1999). But see infra notes 136-38, and accompanying
text, discussing the November 1999 amendment to the Trademark Dilution Act, which
specifically prohibits the use of a registered trademark as a second-level domain name by
one who does not rightfully own the intellectual property rights conferred upon registration
of the mark under § 706 of Title 18 of the United States Code or § 220506 of Title 36 of the
United States Code.
" See Nathenson, supra note 17, at 952 ("Eventually, the entire domain name, '.com'
and all, may itself be registrable as a trademark.").
65 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
' See General Help: Legal Questions, Network Solutions, Inc., at http://www.
networksolutions.com (last visited Nov. 16, 1999).
69
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form of their trade name, trademark, or products before anyone else snatches it up.67
Without question, "the shorter the name, the more likely someone else either uses
or wants to use the name." Even as recently as 1994, however, only one-third of
the Fortune 500 companies had registered "the most desirable forms of their
trademarks" with NSI.69 As a result, many major corporations "have had to cajole,
pay thousands of dollars or even sue to gain the rights to domain names that match"
the trademarks they failed to register years ago.70
E. What is a "Cybersquatter?"
One of the first "cybersquatting" disputes evolved from one man's quirky
personal challenge. Magazine jou'nalist Joshua Quittner registered the name
"mcdonalds.com" simply "to see if he could do it."'71 In exchange for the rights to
the Internet domain name, the journalist demanded that McDonald's donate $3500
to a Brooklyn, New York school.7 In order to have use of the domain name,
McDonald's expressed its willingness to pay the ransom.73
In Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton,74 the court for the Central District of
California was faced with the challenge of clearly characterizing the behavior of the
defendants, who had purchased twelve hundred Internet domain names for
subsequent commercial sale to the public." The court was quick to identify the
defendants as "'cybersquatters,' as that term has come to be commonly
understood. 76 The court further explained:
67 See Nathenson, supra note 17, at 967 ("Domain names . . . may be twenty-six
characters long, and may comprise almost any alphanumeric character. Nevertheless, people
want the shortest, simplest name .... Further, the shorter the name, the more likely someone
else either uses or wants to use the name."); see also id. at 922 (including table depicting a
forty percent increase in domain name registration period in a two-year time period).
6s Nathenson, supra note 17, at 967.
69 Smith, supra note 57, at 1185 n. 135 (citing Andre Brunel, Billions Registered, But No
Rules: The Scope of Trademark Protection for Internet Domain Names, 3 J. PROPRIETARY
RTS. 2, 3 (1995)).
"o Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1234 (N.D. 111. 1996) (quoting Greg
Miller, Cyber Squatters Give Carl's Jr., Others Net Loss, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1996,
available at 1996 WL 11004750).
7, Smith, supra note 57, at 1189 (quoting James W. Morando & Christian H. Nadan, Can
Trademark Law Regulate the Race to Claim Internet Domain Names?, 13 COMPUTER
LAWYER 10, 10 (1996)); see generally Joshua Quittner, Billions Registered: Right Now,
There Are No Rules to Keep You from Owning a Bitchin' Corporate Name as Your Own
Internet Address, WIRED, Oct. 1994.
7 See Quittner, supra note 71.
" See id.
'4 999 F. Supp. 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
" See id.
76 Id. at 1338.
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Like all "cybersquatters," defendants merely "squat" on their registered
domain names until someone else comes along who wishes to use them.
Like all "cybersquatters," defendants usurp all of the accepted meanings
of their domain names, so as to prevent others from using the same
domain names in any of their accepted meanings. And like all
"cybersquatters," defendants seek to make a financial return by exacting
a price before consenting to allow others to use the domain names on
which they have chosen to "squat.""
The key to successful "cybersquatting" is proper timing. Critics of the NSI
first-come, first-served domain name registration system say that this process not
only allows for squatting, but encourages it.' The first person to register a given
name is effectively in control of that name, despite trademark rights or other claims
to ownership.
A review of this developing trend indicates that the typical "cybersquatter"
does not operate the registered domain name for personal use.79 Rather, after
registration, the squatter may affirmatively offer the name to a prospective
purchaser at a high price or simply wait for the captive market to appear on its own,
toting a satisfactory ransom."0 In order to discourage the squatting which is
seemingly facilitated by its registration policy, NSI instituted the requirement that
a domain name registrant put a domain name to use no more than ninety days after
its registration."
Given the growth of Internet use, especially in the commercial context, the
reserved ninety days provides a considerable period during which a trademark
holder may feel pressured to comply with a squatter's demands. During this time,
a corporation is potentially out of the Internet reach of an infinite number of cyber-
customers and market information-seekers. This is precisely the goal of the
squatter, who capitalizes upon the corporation's immediate ambition to use the
Internet to its fullest capacity to further its business."2
What began as one man's challenge has evolved into a lucrative business. In
" id.
' See Sterling, supra note 58, at 736-37 (citing Gary W. Hamilton, Trademarks on the
Internet: Confusion, Collusion or Dilution?, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 3 (1995)).
' See Jennifer Golinveaux, What's ina Domain Name: Is "Cybersquatting" Trademark
Dilution?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 647 (1999); see also Sterling, supra note 58, at 737
(noting that the disparity in numbers of registered domain names and names actually in use
is a good indicator of the prevalence of cybersquatting activity).
8o See id.
" See General Help: Legal Questions, Network Solutions, Inc., at http:/www.
networksolutions.com (last visited Nov. 16, 1999); see also Sterling, supra note 58, at 742.
82 See Swartz, supra note 53, at 1504.
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order to prevent squatters from holdingtheir preferred domain names for ransom,
commercial entities have been forced to take preventative measures. In order to
defend themselves against this type of activity, it is suggested that companies
register every possible variation of their corporate name, logo, popular products, or
other corporate identifier. 3 There. is evidence to suggest that, faced with a
continuing use of the first-come, first-served registration system, many Fortune 500
companies have heeded this warning.M
II. APPLICATION OF THE LANHAM ACT TO "CYBERSQUATTING"
A. Congress' Commerce Clause Power
There is no explicit language granting Congress the power to regulate
trademarks, but Congress has acted consistently pursuant to the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution, which states that "Congress shall have Power To
... regulate Commerce... among the several States."'85 Traditionally, Congress has
regulated three broad categories of commercial activity: the channels of interstate
and foreign commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce, and
those activities having a substantial effect on interstate and foreign commerce."
First, regulation of the channels of commerce relates to those modes of travel
utilized in the course of commercial activity, including highways, waterways, and
air traffic. 7 Second, Congress can regulate the instrumentalities of commerce."
This includes the people, machines, and other logistical items used in carrying out
commercial activity. Finally, the broadest category of constitutionally-regulated
activity includes those activities which have a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce.
9
B See Ughetta Manzone, Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 249, 260-61 (1999) (citing Ian C. Ballon, Intellectual Property Protection andRelated
Third Party Liability, 482 PLI/PAT 559, 612 (1997)); see also General Help: Legal
Questions, Network Solutions, Inc., at http://www.networksolutions.com (last visited Nov.
16, 1999).
8 See Manzone, supra note 83, at 260-61. But see Smith, supra note 57, and
accompanying text (noting that in 1994, only one-third of the Fortune 500 companies had
registered "the most desirable forms of their trademarks").
85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
87 See id. at 558 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,256
(1964)); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941).
88 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (197 1);
Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); S.R.R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20
(1911)).
89 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)); see also Wickard v. Filburn,
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The historical analysis of whether the -particular activity directly or indirectly
affects interstate commerce hasbecome largely irrelevant." Rather, the activity in
question must belong to a general class of activities: that, taken together,
substantially affect interstate commerce.9'. Although perhaps not considered
singularly economic, an activity may be deemed economic or commercial if the
cumulative effect of the activity brings about an economic result.92
In Wickard v. Filburn," the Supreme Court sought to determine whether
Congress had the power to regulate an individual farmer's wheat production in
excess of a national legislative quota. Although the vast majority of the wheat the
farmer produced was consumed by the farmer himself, the Supreme Court held that
the small amount of wheat grown for entirely personal intrastate use, when
considered in the aggregate with all such uses, had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce and therefore could be .regulated by Congress under its Commerce
•Clause power. 94 The use of the "substantial effects test" is an incredibly expansive
view, yet it remains the prevalent standard today.
-This sweeping grant of authority should be contrasted with the Supreme Court's
more recent decision in United States v. Lopez,95 which addressed a constitutional
challenge to the Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990." The federal government
justified its power to regulate the possession of a hand gun within a specified and
demarcated distance from a school under the Commerce Clause.' The
government's principal argument was that the possession of a hand gun in a school
zone had negative repercussions on the national economy. in that it deteriorated the
quality of students' education and their ability to focus on academic success.9"
Unlike the limited farming activity considered in Wickard, the Court reasoned
that the possession of a gun within a school zone was not an economic activity at
all, nor would it, through the occurrence of numerous similar incidents,
substantially affect interstate commerce." While recognizing the government's
good intentions aimed at protecting children and preserving the quality and nature
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) ("But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts
a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce ...
9' See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555-56.
91 See id. at 559.
See id. at 559-60.
93 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
9s 514 U.S. 549 (1995)..
96 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(IXa) (Supp. V 1993).
97 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64 ("The government's essential contention, infine, is that
we may determine that [the Act] is valid because possession of a firearm in a local school
zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce.").
98 See id. at 563-64.
See id.
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of education, the Court dismissed the argument that a tangible connection existed
between gun possession in a school zone and the national economy."° Based on its
application of the "substantial effects test," the Court held that the statute exceeded
Congress' Commerce Clause power.'0'
B. Federal Trademark Dilution Act
The first legislative act to regulate trademarks was passed in 1870,1"2 but was
rejected by the Supreme Court as an over-reaching application of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause.0 3 Modem federal trademark law is contained in the
Lanham Act, enacted by Congress in 1 946.' ° Reliance upon the Commerce Clause
power imports a critical limitation on Congress's enforcement of the Lanham Act,
which only applies to those marks used in interstate and foreign trade.'05
In 1995, Congress enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act"°  ("the Act"),
which became Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act. The Act reads, in pertinent part:
"The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled ... to an injunction against another
person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins
after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of
the mark . ,, ." Pursuant to the limitations on Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause, non-commercial use of a mark is not actionable.'
,00 See id at 564-66.
10 See id. at 565-66.
102 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 210, §§ 77-84.
m03 See The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879); see generally Smith, supra note
57, at 1179 (describing the history of the Lanham Act); Sterling, supra note 58, at 748
(describing the history of the Lanham Act).
104 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
101 See id. § 105 1(a)(3XC).
'06 Id § 1125(c).
Id. § 1125(cXl).
'0" See id. § 1125(c)(4XB). "Use in commerce" refers to:
the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely
to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be
deemed to be in use in commerce-
(1) on goods when-
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto,
or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then
on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services
and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in
more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the
person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with
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The Act serves a specific purpose which had gone unsatisfied by the Lanham
Act prior to its amendment in 1995: it gave rise to a new cause of action, dilution,
which would "protect the value of famous marks and the substantial investments
made by the mark's owner against 'those who would appropriate the mark for their
own gain.""" At the same time, the Trademark Dilution Act reinforces the
underlying purposes ofth°Lanham Act itself, which is "to protect the public so that
it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark
which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get,"
and to protect the trademark owner's "investment from. its misappropriation by
pirates and cheats."'10
The original legislative history of the Trademark Dilution Act seems to indicate
that one proposed purpose for the amendment was bringing the activity of
"cybersquatters" under the control of Section 43(a)."' Recent amendments to the
Act seem to clearly indicate that this is surely the case, by the inclusion of a
provision specifically addressing "cybersquatting" activity, both within and beyond
our national borders.
C. Application of Trademark Dilution Act to "Cybersquatting"
The most notable application of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act to the
activity of a "cybersquatter" is Panavision International v. Toeppen."' The
the services.
Id. § 1127.
1' Nathenson, supra note 17, at 963 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030).
1I0 S. REP. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274; seeS. REP.
No. 100-515, at 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5605 (1988 amendment);
see also Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 1949),
affd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950) (highlighting as a special purpose of the
Lanham Act, the elimination of "other forms of misrepresentations which are of the same
general character even though they do not involve any use of what can technically be called
a trade-mark."); DAVID LANGE ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES & MATERIALS 89
(1998).
"' See 141 CONG. REC. S19312-01 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
("Although no one else has yet considered this application, it is my hope that this
antidilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who
are choosing marks that are associated with the products and .reputations of others."); see
also Nathenson, supra note 17, at 963; Sterling, supra note 58, at 749-50 ("Businesses in
need of protection against domain name pirates look to sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham
Act to create a cause of action against the unlawful use of registered or unregistered
marks."). Courts have cited Senator Leahy's statements to support the application of the Act
to "cybersquatters." See, e.g., Panavision Int'l., L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th
Cir. 1998).
'12 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
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defendant Toeppen purchased a number of Internet domain names containing
famous registered trademarks belonging to several notable American corporations.
One of these, Panavision, held registered trademarks in the name "Panavision,"
which it used to identify its product line of motion picture camera equipment." 3
When Panavision attempted to register the Internet domain name
"panavision.com" with NSI in December of 1995, it was refused the opportunity to
do so since Dennis Toeppen had already registered that exact name." 4 Panavision
promptly notified Toeppen of its registered trademark in the name "Panavision,"
and based on its ownership rights, demanded that Toeppen relinquish the domain
name using the registered mark.' Toeppen generally refused but offered to sell the
name to Panavision for $13,000. "' Payment of the specified ransom also included
Toeppen's promise not to "acquire any other Internet addresses which are alleged
by Panavision Corporation to be its property."""
When Panavision refused his offer, Toeppen registered another Internet domain
name using Panavision's other trademark, "Panaflex.""' On this site, Toeppen
simply posted a message which read, "Hello.""' The "panavision.com" site,
meanwhile, displayed a photograph of the town of Pana, Illinois.' Panavision
responded by filing an action in the District Court for the Central District of
California."'
The court identified the issue of trademark dilution as whether "the defendant
violated federal.., law by intentionally registering the plaintiff's trademarks as his
Internet domain names for the purpose of exacting payment from the plaintiff in
exchange for the termination of the registrations of the domain names."'." In order
to find that Toeppen's actions constituted trademark dilution under section 43(c) of
the Lanham Act, four questions had to be answered in the affirmative: (1) Was the
"Panavision" trademark famous?; (2) Was Toeppen's use of "Panavision"
trademark a commercial use?; (3) Did Toeppen's use of"Panavision" as a domain
name actually dilute the trademark?; and (4) Did Toeppen's use of the mark begin
after the mark became famous?'
Toeppen did not dispute that the "Panavision" mark was famous. 4 Rather, he
"3 See id. at 1298-99.
"1 See id. at 1300.
"' Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319.
116 See id.
117 Id.
"8 See id.
"9 See id
120 See id.
12 See id
121 Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1298.
123 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324.
124 See id.
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challenged Panavision's assertion that his registration of trademarked domain
names was a "commercial use," and that this use subsequently resulted in
dilution."2" Reaffirming a finding of dilution by the district court, the Ninth Circuit
stated: "Toeppen did considerably more than simply register Panavision's
trademarks as his domain names onthe Internet. He registered those names as part
of a scheme to obtain money-from Panavision."
26
Courts have continued to, extend the scope of the Trademark Dilution Act to
cover the activity of "cybersquatters" based on an individual's intent to extract
money from a trademark holder, as promulgated by the Panavision court.27 As a
primary example of the continued application of Panavision line of reasoning,
Toeppen was challenged a second time in Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen."' The "use
in commerce" requirement was summarily discussed, with the court concluding that
it was satisfied merely by the utilization of the Internet as a commercial medium.
The Ninth Circuit again faced a corporation's challenge to a "cybersquatter"
who held their trademarks for hostage inAveryDennison Corp. v. Sumpton'29 The
defendant Sumpton, an Internet e-mail provider, registered the names "avery.net"
and "dennison.net" as part of a business which provided "vanity" e-mail
addresses.' Sumpton's prior registration prevented Avery Dennison from fully
using its registered trademarks "Avery" and "Dennison" as part of their corporate
home page address.'
Moving away from the intent-focused approach in the Toeppen cases, the court
applied a limited interpretation of the "commercial use in commerce"
requirement.' The court highlighted the fact that Sumpton did not use Avery-
Dennison's trademarks for their "non-trademark value."'3 In so noting, the court
concluded that the marks were not being used in a way ordinarily considered to be
commercial, and that the meaning of "commercial" would not be modified to
encompass "cybersquatting" activity. 34
Courts have somewhat consistently followed Panavision in the majority of
"cybersquatting" cases filed since, bending the Trademark Dilution Act to meet this
highly-specialized and unanticipated activity. 3 ' It is unclear, however, how much
125 See id.
126 Id. at 1318.
17 See Golinveaux, supra note 79, at 657 (noting further that squatting on a famous mark
erases the mark's ability to identify goods or services on the Internet).
'28 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (N.D. 11. 1996).
129 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
130 See id. at 872-73.
131 See id.
132 See id at 879-80.
"I See id. at 880.
134 See id.
3 See, e.g., McRae's, Inc. v. Hussain, 105 F. Supp. 2d 594,598 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Shaw
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longer Panavision will remain the primary source of guidance as courts are faced
with the application of new statutory language specifically designed to address the
activity of Dennis Toeppen and others like him.
D. The Cyberpiracy Prevention Amendment
On November 29, 1999, Congress amended Section 43.of the Lanham Act to
include a provision specifically addressing the "cybersquatting" issue. Today found
under the heading "Cyberpiracy Prevention" and dubbed the Anti-Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection statute,136 the amendment specifically provides protection for
registrants of United States trademarks by prohibiting the registration or use of
those trademarks as Internet domain names by anyone other than the mark's owner.
In particular, the amendment creates a cause of action against the registrant of a
domain name if that registrant has violated any intellectual property right of the
mark's owner.""
The amendment requires a positive showing of bad faith on the part of the
registrant, and the plain language of the statute indicates that registration alone is
enough to create such liability. The individual possessing such "bad faith intent"
subsequently "registers, traffics in, or uses . ." the United States registered
trademark as a domain name.'38
Congress offers several specific factors which may be considered by the courts
in making a determination of an individual's required bad faith intent. Most
notably, this list includes a positive showing of the registrant's "prior use, if any,
of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or
services," the registrant's "bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site
accessible under the domain name," and the registration of numerous domain names
which the registrant knows to be identical or to dilute registered trademarks.'39
Cases were filed shortly after the passage of the amendment. One of the first
v. Rizzoli Int'l Publ'ns., Inc., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
36
,See Lanham Act, § 43(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. 1 1999). The amendment
provides, in relevant part, that:
(1)(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark,
including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section,
if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that person-
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name
which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that...
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of title
18, United States Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United States Code.
Id.
3 See id. § 1 125(d)(l)(A)(i).
139 Id. § 1125(d)(l)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
139 Id § I 125(d)(I)(B)(i)(III), (IV), (VIII).
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of such cases involved the National Football League and two of its affiliates, which
assert, among other claims, that the Internet domain names owned and operated by
Ken Miller of Clearlake, California dilute the strength of the NFL's distinctive
trademark.' Miller operates web sites using the names "NFLtoday.com,"
"NFLtoday.net," and "NFLtoday.org," where he makes predictions about upcoming
games, publishes statistics, and supplies links to other gambling-related sites and
the NFL's official web site, "NFL.com". T" In addition, Miller uses the sites to
1$142advertise the sale of "NFL Today Power Picks.
In another case, Harvard College seeks redress in the form of a preliminary
injunction against two individuals, Michael Rhys and Michael Douglas, for having
registered and advertised for sale, numerous domain names which include the
names "Harvard" and "Radcliffe."' 43 The Harvard College Board of Trustees
alleges that Rhys and Douglas have registered more than sixty-five such names,
including "harvard-lawyer.com," "harvardcampus.com," and "harvard-doctor.com,"
to name a few.' The Board demands that the public sale of these names be
enjoined and that Rhys and Douglas be compelled to remove all references to either
Harvard or Radcliffe from these sites.'45
While none of these early filings has yet to come to judgment, one can only
surmise that the immediate interest and application of the amendment will continue
and will only increase in importance in terms of United States courts' dealing with
future "cybersquatter" activity. It is therefore with increased urgency that we must
closely examine the application of the Act to the actions of foreign-citizen
"cybersquatters" as it relates to the constitutionality and practicality of protecting
American trademarks on the World Wide Web.
III. "CYBERSQUATrING" IS NOT A COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
A. The "Commercial Use in Commerce" Requirement
Although a seemingly redundant word choice, the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act purposefully encompasses a two-part commercial activity requirement,
14o See NFL Uses New Cybersquatting Law to Seek Injunction Against Gambling Web
Site, 17 ANDREWS COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUS. Lmo. REP. 9 (2000), WL 17 No. 8
ANCOILR 9 [hereinafter NFL]; NFL v. Miller, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1574 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
2000) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss based on his claims that he is not subject to
jurisdiction of any court in New York and that venue is improper).
14' See NFL, supra note 140.
142 See id.
'"" See Harvard Sues Cybersquatters for Trademark Infringement, 17 ANDREWS
COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUS. Lmo. REP. 10 (2000), WL 17 No. 8 ANCOILR 10.
144 See id.
143 See id.
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"commercial use in commerce."'46 The second part of the requirement, "in
commerce," is the statutory articulation of the limitations on Congress to regulate
trademarks only to the extent that the marks fall within its power under the
Commerce Clause.
Guided by the Panavision decision, most-courts, to date, seem to think that
"cybersquatting" constitutes the requisite "commercial use in commerce" of an
Internet domain name. Indeed, many courts have rather automatically accepted the
notion that Congress' Commerce Clause powers extend to "cybersquatting" activity
based solely on the "broad jurisdictional powers upon the courts of the United
States." 4"
Turning to the language and legislative history of the Lanham Act, regulation
has been justified with the argument that "cybersquatting" runs against the core
purposes of federal trademark law.'48 A squatter's unauthorized use is precisely the
object of the Lanham Act and therefore, curtailing the activity is deemed a rightful
application of the statute's language.
The Toeppen precedents indicate that the primary basis for a finding of
"commercial use in commerce" lies in a finding of the defendant's intent to ransom
the registered domain name. Under this logic, the domain name itself is considered
a "good,"' 49 and is deemed sufficient to satisfy the "in commerce" requirement. For
example, the Panavision court explained that, "Toeppen's 'business' is to register
trademarks as domain names and then sell them to the rightful trademark owners
.... It does not matter that he did not attach the marks to a product. Toeppen's
.commercial use was his attempt to sell the trademarks themselves."'
' 0
The Panavision court speculated, however, that had Toeppen registered the
domain names without demanding money to ransom the names to the trademark
holder, this would perhaps not be considered "commercial use in commerce" of the
marks at issue."' Ifthe turning point is the defendant's intent to ransom the domain
Z46 Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 11995).
141 Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239-40 (N.D. 111. 1996) (quoting
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952)); see Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (giving "in commerce"
broad interpretation), affid, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998).
148 Cybersquatting is an "unauthorized use of a domain name which includes a protected
trademark to engage in commercial activity over the Internet .... Such use is in direct
conflict with federal trademark law." Cardservice Int'l v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741
(E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd, 129 F.3d 1258 (4th Cir. 1997).
141 See Kimberly Alacantara, Trademarks in Cyberspace, 486 PLI/PAT 429,436 (1997)
(noting that the product Toeppen was attempting to sell was the trademark itself).
'o Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998).
... Id. at 1324 ("Registration of a trade[mark] as a domain name, without more, is not a
commercial use of the trademark and therefore is not within the prohibitions of the Act.")
(quoting Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996)); see
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949,960 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
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name to its respective trademark holder, then not all uses of the Internet are
commercial ones. Many domain name registrants are not engaged in any sort of
commercial activity, but rather register their own name, nickname, or other
favorable combination of alphanumeric characters in order to personalize their web
site." '
It is also important to note that the Trademark Dilution Act does not require that
"commercial use in commerce" of a mark be in connection with goods or services,
as is required for a finding of trademark infringement under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.' Courts have conceded that "cybersquatter" defendants rarely use
the trademarks in their registered domain names in connection with goods or
services. 
5 4
There is no doubt that trademark holders' rights should be afforded protection
in the Internet context, including protection from those who would hold hostage the
valuable product of a company's research efforts, money, and good will. This is in
keeping with the purpose of the Trademark Dilution Act. 5 It is not constitutionally
permissible, however, to allow Congress to shelter the giant corporate registered
trademark holders from foreign-citizen Internet users' attempts to sign up for
recognizable or famous second-level domain names.
B. Channels of Commerce
The information which is displayed graphically on an Internet web site
originates from a computer data file. Although technology is rapidly changing, as
it works now, the information contained thereupon is electronically translated and
sent across telephone lines."5 6 The information is then viewable by all those with
(holding that NSI's acceptance of a domain name for registration is not a commercial use
within the meaning of the Trademark Dilution Act); Juno Online Servs., L.P. v. Juno
Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (explaining that "warehousing" of
domain names is not sufficient to find commercial use).
2 See Smith, supra note 57, at 1197-98 (arguing that the mere purchase and maintenance
of a web site is not commercial activity); Nathenson, supra note 17, at 965 n.314 ("[T]he
mere fact that a personal home page is on the Internet, by itself, should not be enough to
satisfy 'use in commerce.').
1 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
15 See, e.g.,Intermatic, Inc. v.Toeppen,947F. Supp. 1227,1235 (N.D. Ill. 1996)(noting
that Toeppen did not plan to use the "intermatic.com" domain name as a web site).
151 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 24:70, at 24-126-27 (noting that "the underlying
rationale of the dilution doctrine is that the gradual diminution or whittling away of the value
of a trademark, resulting from use by another, constitutes an invasion of the senior user's
property right and good will in his mark").
156 See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871,874 ("A typical ISP connects with
the Internet via leased telecommunications lines, which its consumers access through
'dialup' connections over ordinary telephone lines.").
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access to the Internet. Based on the use of telephone lines to convey the
electronically-coded data, the Internet already has been analogized to a highway or
air route, leading to its identification as a channel of commerce.'-
To characterize the issue as one relating to a "channel of commerce," however,
is to misinterpret completely the fundamental activity at occurrence. A
"cybersquatter" may connect to the Internet from some location outside of the
United States. Having accessed the NSI/InterNIC web site from his location beyond
United States borders, he or she then selects a unique combination of alphanumeric
characters which is then registered as a domain name by filling in the blanks of a
form printed on an Internet web site. 18
At issue is not the activity of completing the registration, involving the transfer
of rights in the name for the transfer of electronic financial consideration. Rather,
the focus is on the rights themselves, the fact that one individual in a foreign
country has something that American big business claims as its own. This
ownership claim is a construct of traditional trademark law,'59 which as of yet bears
no correlation in terms of ownership rights in Internet domain names. While
modem trademark law is capable of protecting and preserving the intellectual
property rights of those who avail themselves of American commerce, it is not as
yet suited to police activity occurring in a geographically amorphous environment.
Modem trademark law has its roots in the common law, where ownership rights
resulted from the use of an identifying mark in a geographically confined
commercial setting."6 In practical terms, this meant that rights to a given mark
were only enforceable within the limited area in which it was commercially
utilized) 6. ' Regulation of the activity of "cybersquatters" through the Lanham Act,
therefore, requires a drastic extension of traditional trademark law. It seems
illogical to apply a statute which has a foundation in geographic precision and
market penetration to a technology, quite unlike a highway or waterway, which has
no physical form and knows no terrestrial boundaries. 62
'" See Manzone, supra note 83, at 263 (citing Craig W. Harding, Selected Issues in
Electronic Commerce: New Technologies and Legal Paradigms, 491 PLI/PAT 7,9 (1997)).
"' See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
159 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 2:14, at 2-31 (describing trademark rights in
relation to common law property rights).
'" See Thrifty Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 831 F.2d 1177,1180 (1 st Cir.
1987) (recognizing that resolution of infringement issue "revolves around geographical
market protection").
161 See Smith, supra note 57, at 1179.
162 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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C. Instrumentalities of Commerce
Other courts have readily identified "cybersquatting" as commercial use based
on the very nature of the Internet as a developing communications medium.'6 3 The
District Court in Panavision found that Toeppen's use of the Internet satisfied the
"in commerce" requirement "because communications transmit instantaneously on
a world-wide basis.'"" This argument stems largely from the physical structure of
the Internet as the "information superhighway."
The most outstanding characteristic of the Internet is its ability to reach
computer users all over the world via transmission of data across interstate and
international telephone lines.'65 Yet, the Internet's lack of physical boundaries
distinguishes electronic communications from traditional telephone or postal
communications. Regulation of interstate communications over the Internet is
simply impossible because "no such communications exist.""'
The issue is clouded by a definition of the relevant commodity.
"Cybersquatting" itself is not an act of Internet transmission, nor the passage of
information over traditionally-regulated telephone lines. Rather, at issue is the
second-level domain name itself, a commodity neither created exclusively for
American use nor one to be claimed as of right by any other nation. Under the
current system of registration, the second-level domain name belongs to whomever
signs up first, regardless of nationality.'67
The second-level domain name is a select group of letters which, taken together,
represent someone, something, or some organization. It is not a physical
commodity able to be handled, shipped in the mail with an invoice and a return
receipt, or bought and sold using conventional means. As a quasi-commodity
available in the "global marketplace," second-level domain names within
internationally available top-level domains are not within Congress' exclusive
grasp.
163 See Smith, supra note 57, at 1192 ("For years it has been recognized that the means
through which information is disseminated is considered to be in commerce even if the
person utilizing that means is not engaged in commercial activity.").
" Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1238-39 (quoting 1 GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION
AND PRACTICE, 5.122 (1996)); see Swartz, supra note 53, at 1513 (linking "the nature of
Internet communications" with "courts' broad jurisdictional powers.").
161 See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1434
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
'" ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999).
'67 See supra notes 30-31, 51 and accompanying text.
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D. Substantial Effects on Commerce
Using the analysis presented by the Supreme Court in Wickard v. Filburn,68 it
is argued that even private use of domain names may be considered activity within
the realm of interstate commerce. 69 The farmer's activity is easily distinguished,
however, from that of the "cybersquatter." By growing his own wheat in his own
personal fields, Wickard purposefully withheld, money and wheat from the
aggregated, national market -for wheat."'7 If many other farmers were to engage in
a similar activity, the result would be a severe detriment to the national market for
wheat and the quantity openly available for public consumption. An entirely local
issue, therefore, when considered with all such uses on a national scale, becomes
a national concern and thus justifies regulation, by Congress.
In contrast, when a non-United States citizen "cybersquatter," sitting outside of
United States borders becomes the first to register a trademarked domain name and
then offers that domain name for sale to the trademark owner or the general public,
his personal activity affects the worldwide market for generic TLDs. When
registered domain names contain American corporate trademarks, trade names, or
service marks, global electronic commerce is affected, based on the Internet's
worldwide scope and the international availability of other TLDs.
Recall that big business intends to make use of the Internet's most powerful
feature: the ability to reach the "global marketplace."'' The physical limitations
of the Internet allow for only one of any particular set of alphanumeric characters
to exist. The "cybersquatter" simply removes that one particular set of characters
from the entire market for domain names. In doing so, he has not precluded the
American corporation from reaching web consumers, nor has he precluded the
corporation from registering an identical set of alphanumerical characters as a
second-level domain name on a different top-level domain. Rather than diminish
the national market for a particular good, the "cybersquatter" removes one name
from the infinite list of possible names, but only within one specific TLD.
The desire to protect a registered or distinctive mark is indeed a valid one, not
unlike the desire to keep firearms out of our nation's schools. However, as the
Supreme Court recently noted, the Commerce Clause powers cannot be relied upon
to bolster a valid social goal, however important, without some other constitutional
safeguard.' 72
'" 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
'69 See Smith, supra note 57, at 1192-93 (noting the likelihood that all transmissions of
information via the Internet, both for commercial and non-commercial purposes, will be
deemed commercial activity).
170 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114-15.
"I Sterling, supra note 58, at 733-34.
'72 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (noting that reliance upon deference to congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause would, in effect, create a general police power).
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Should the trademark owner decide to- purchase the domain name from the
squatter, that is his choice. Use of a given combination of characters is not entirely
prohibited, as it may be registered in another TLD. The mark in the preferred TLD,
which was captured by the squatter, is still available for sale and simply worth a
higher price. The issue is one of economics, pared down in its simplest form to a
discussion of supply and demand. As domain name registration exists today, there
is a low supply and a high demand. The point at which the two meet invariably
results in the willing buyer paying-more than he would have to at a time when
supply was greater. In economic terms, therefore, the answer to the desperate pleas
of American corporate trademark holders is as simple as increasing the supply of
internationally available TLDs.
The ".com" TLD has reached itsprominence as a locating device simply by the
nature of its exclusivity as one of only a few globally registrable web locators.'73
Reduce its exclusivity by adding more TLDs and the web opens up to more users
and more registrants alike, thus resulting in an increased consumer base.
The squatter's use of the Internet domain name, which he fortuitously captured,
is his own province. Should he simply design the site to welcome visitors with the
word "hi," he is not using the web site for any commercial purpose. By the same
token, should he actively solicit ransom bids or wait patiently for the trademark
owner to come calling, this is not a "commercial use in commerce" of a valid
trademark as is intended in the specific language of the Lanham Act. 74
By definition, the "cybersquatter" does not use or intend to use the trademark
to identify a particular source or quality,' nor does he use the trademark "in
connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods and services."'7
Rather, he capitalizes upon the non-commercial value of a trademarked word or
name by effectively preventing the trademark owner from making the most
commercially viable use of the Internet.'"
Furthermore, the international "cybersquatter" logs on to NSI's web site from
his personal computer, which is connected to the Internet in some location
somewhere beyond United States borders. He is not, simply by accessing
NSI/InterNIC's web site, participating in American commerce. Rather, he is a
consumer bargaining in the "global marketplace," a yet relatively undefined and
unstructured economic environment which, by the very nature of the Internet, is
entirely international and not exclusively domestic.
'73 See Nathenson, supra note 17, at 922 (highlighting the international popularity of the
".com" top-level domain); see also supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et. seq.
' See Golinveaux, supra note 79, at 662.
7 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949,957 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
'77 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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This is not to say that "cybersquatting" is an acceptable practice, nor is it meant
to indicate that trademark owners are defenseless against "cybersquatters," both
foreign and domestic. Rather, this simply suggests that the traditional application
of the Trademark Dilution Act to this type of Internet activity is an unconstitutional
application of Congress' Commerce Clause powers and would be better served by
an international, collective forum. As an international medium of technology and
communication, the Internet requires input from all potential users. No doubt the
United States controls a large portion of the web and can offer great insight on the
issue, but without the input from other nations, international "cybersquatting" is out
of Congress' sole grasp.'
IV. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
While the Internet has certainly augmented the developing trends toward
"global shrinking," bringing economies and cultures closer together than ever
before possible, it simply does not follow that the "web" spun around the globe can
capture Internet users and automatically subject them to the strictures of Congress'
regulation.'" Rather, the globalization of both communications and commerce
suggests the importance of an international approach to a decidedly global problem.
"The unique nature of the Internet highlights the likelihood that a single actor might
be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation
.... Typically . . . jurisdictional limits are related to geography; geography,
however, is a virtually meaningless construct on the Internet."'10
In order to prevent losing their valued trademarks to Internet domain names
' To date, most domain name disputes involving U.S. registered trademarks have been
resolved in reference to U.S. law. See Angela Proffitt, Note & Comment, Drop the
Government, Keep the Law: New International Body for Domain Name Assignment Can
Learn From United States Trademark Experience, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 601, 602
(1999).
"I See Andrew E. Costa, Comment, Minimum Contacts in Cyberspace: A Taxonomy of
the Case Law, 35 Hous. L. REv. 453, 478 (1998) ("As the world becomes smaller, the
courts' power over distant defendants increases. Seen in the light of technology feeding this
expanding formulation of jurisdiction, the Internet is possibly 'the latest and greatest
manifestation of these historical, globe-shrinking trends."') (quoting CompuServe, Inc. v.
Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996)).
"o ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Am. Libraries
Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)) (noting the inability of state
laws to effectively regulate the Intemet based on the Commerce Clause).
Federal regulation in the area is analogous. Geographic boundaries no more exist on
a federal level than they do on a state level. Demanding compliance with United States
federal regulation of the Internet from foreign web users creates the same opportunity for
inconsistent policy as does a state regulation promulgated by New Mexico, for example,
regulating the Internet activity of a citizen of Oklahoma.
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held by international "cybersquatters," today's commercial entities are encouraged
to register their trademarks as domain names in all of the countries in which they
do business or wish to advertise.' This is because trademark dilution has been
recognized as a cause of action in international courts only recently. 2
In an effort to recognize the effect of the domain name registration system on
the international community, the United States Department of Commerce plans to
restructure the present system, removing it from federal government control under
Network Solutions, Inc.' In June of 1998, the Department of Commerce released
its initial proposals in a Statement of Policy for privatizing the current system.'"
Referred to as "the Internet White Paper," the Statement specifically addresses
the interests of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and suggests
that the international organization make recommendations for a dispute resolution
policy.'85 Among other far-reaching goals, the Internet White Paper urges that
potentially infringing domain names be evaluated in a court of law in the
jurisdiction in which the domain name registry or registry database is located." 6
Transition from the current federally operated system through NSI is expected to
be complete by September 30, 2000."' 7
The new system will be facilitated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN), an American nonprofit organization which will
oversee the competitive distribution of names and consider increasing the number
of top-level domains.' As proposed, the ICANN Board of Directors would be
comprised of members of the international community and highly specialized
individuals to represent the multitude of interests involved. 89 In addition, the
Department of Commerce plans to meet with members of the international
community to solicit suggestions and comments regarding the new registration
8 See Proffitt, supra note 178, at 622 n. 187; see also supra note 83 and accompanying
text.
1.2 See David W. Maher, A Cyberspace Perspective on Governance, Standards, and
Control: Trademark Law on the Internet-Will It Scale? The Challenge to Develop
International Trademark Law, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 3, 14 (1997)
(further noting that the scope of international trademark law is changing with the
development of new treaties specifically including protection from trademark dilution).
3 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:73, at 25-153.
14 See Statement of Policy on the Management of Internet Names and Addresses, at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6 -T35-T398dns.htm (last visited June 5,
1998).
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 See W. Scott Petty, The White Paper: Overhaul of the Internet by the Feds, INTELL.
PROP. TODAY, July 1998, at 24.
198 See id.
189 See id
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International "cybersquatting" is a problem that implicates each web-using
country's current definition of trademark rights and future definitions of Internet
regulation. In order to preserve the interests of Internet users worldwide, the arena
for this discussion must be a global one. The proposed new domain name
registration system, as overseen by a United States-based organization as opposed
to the federal government, is an affirmative step in the right direction though
perhaps still not the most appropriate forum for equitable change.
The call for global participation simply cannot be too loud. All nations must
step in, and do so immediately, in order to assert and protect their citizens' rights
and interests. In these technology-based years immediately following the turn of
the millennium, use of the Internet may well prove to be the make-it-or-break-it
factor in economic and political success. Those who remain silent on these key
issues today may find themselves completely silenced in the future.
CONCLUSION
The courts' traditional application of the Trademark Dilution Act to
international "cybersquatters" is the result of an obviously Ameri-centric view of
technology and commerce, as is the recent amendment to the Lanham Act, the Anti-
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection statute. 9 The apparently preferred ".com"
TLD is not, as it is often supposed, an American exclusive and should not be treated
as such by American courts or government.
Failure to reserve a company's trademark in the ".com" TLD would not, in fact,
preclude the company from achieving a commercially viable utilization of the
Internet. Concurrent names may exist amongst the varying TLDs. Therefore, a
name reserved in the ".com" TLD would not preclude the registration of the exact
same combination of alphanumeric characters in any of the other TLDs.1
92
New policies being implemented by ICANN and the United States Department
of Commerce stress the need for more top-level domains and would reduce the
competition and concern over names within the ".com" TLD. The International Ad
Hoc Committee, specifically charged with researching the viability of such policies,
has suggested that an additional seven top-level domains become available,
including ".nom" for individuals, ".firm" for businesses, ".web" forthe World Wide
Web, ".info" for information service providers, ".shop" for retail merchants, ".arts"
for cultural activities, and ".rec" for recreation. 93
'90 See id.
'9' See Lanham Act, § 43(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. 1 1999).
'9 See Golinveaux, supra note 79, at 643.
'9 See Petty, supra note 187, at 24.
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The Internet is not constrained by physical borders or governmental policies.'
As one of his principal arguments, defendant Dennis Toeppen argued that any
injury which may have resulted from his registration en-masse of famous
trademarks as domain names occurred not clearly within any particularjurisdiction,
but rather in "cyberspace."' 95
The unique nature of the Internet stems from the fact that it is the first truly
international communications medium. InACLUv. Reno,' the court explains that
the purpose of the Internet is "to serve as the platform for a global, online store of
knowledge, containing information from a diversity of sources and accessible to
Internet users around the world."'97 The United States government could never
have realized that the result of its research directive for a new communications
medium in the 1960s would revolutionize international communications and
commerce.
9 8
Certainly, in a civil law system, older regulations are capable of adaptation to
unanticipated changes in policy, technology, and economics. Just as controversial
issues such as abortion, gn-free school zones, and euthanasia could never have
been foreseen by the Framers of the Constitution, neither could the Internet.
Whereas abortion, school zones, and euthanasia can be discussed and negotiated on
a domestic level in the state and federal forums, the Internet is distinguished by its
inherent physical limitations. Discussion concerning such a global issue requires
a town meeting to which the world's population is invited. Furthermore, perhaps
the best answer to the problem is not an adaptation, legislative or judicial, of an
existing law; .rather, the equitable solution may lie in the drafting of highly
specialized language negotiated by all of the world players, taking into account the
needs of all peoples and all corporate entities, not just those fortunate enough to be
sitting within United States borders.
HEA THERA. FORREST
'9 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (noting that cyberspace is "located in
no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with
access to the Internet"); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1370-71 (1996) (noting that cyberspace lacks
territorial boundaries); see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
("From a user's perspective, it may appear to be a single, integrated system, but in reality it
has no centralized control point.").
'~ Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998).
'9 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
'9' Id at 836.
'9' See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; 583-86 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(acknowledging that the modem advances in communication and technology were simply
not foreseen or imagined by the Framers of the Constitution).
